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Abstract 4 
This study adopts a heuristic technique to argue the thesis that a set of norms rooted in the African 5 
philosophy of Ubuntu can usefully supplement current research guidelines for dealing with incidental 6 
findings discovered in genomic research. The consensus regarding incidental findings is that there is an 7 
ethical obligation to return individual genetic incidental findings that meet the threshold of analytic and 8 
clinical validity, have clinical utility, and are actionable, provided that research contributors have not 9 
opted out from receiving such information. This study outlines the hurdles that may hinder the 10 
integration of this consensus in mainstream clinical practice and shows how an ethical theory from the 11 
global south may be used to address the same. This will advance the field of ethical, legal, and social 12 
issues of personalized medicine by providing exposure to the under-represented African perspective on 13 
the ethical, legal, and social issues of genomics.  14 
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 18 
Background 19 
This study shows how an African philosophy of Ubuntu is a useful philosophy for supplementing current 20 
research guidelines regarding research results. Specifically, the study demonstrates how Ubuntu 21 
philosophy may be of assistance in addressing the obstacles that can hinder the implementation of the 22 
consensus to return some Incidental findings (hereafter: IFs) discovered in genomic research, thereby 23 
contributing towards clarifying the ancillary obligations owed participants. This will advance the field of 24 
ELSI, by providing exposure to the under-represented African perspective on the ethical, legal, and social 25 
issues of genomics.  26 
IFs have become a recurrent feature in many fields of medicine (O'Sullivan, Muntinga, Grigg, & 27 
Ioannidis, 2018) – such as radiology, orthodontics, surgery to name a few; this study focuses on genomic 28 
research. (Genomic) research will be very vital in the push towards the integration of precision 29 
medicine1 within the clinical context. The ability of technologies that are essential for genomic research, 30 
such as the next-generation sequencing technologies which cover whole genome and exome sequencing 31 
and machine learning, to uncover findings unrelated to research aims is equally generating intense 32 
ethical debates regarding how to manage IFs in genomic research effectively. Several scholars have 33 
                                                             
1 That is, the right drug/ treatment for the right patient, at the right dose, and at the right time. 
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weighed in on this debate from diverse backgrounds. Though the debate is far from settled (and may 1 
likely intensify with further advancement in genomic technologies), the emerging consensus in the 2 
literature is that IFs that meet certain thresholds should be returned to research participants.  3 
This emerging consensus, however, will likely face some compliance and implementation hurdles. This 4 
study outlines these hurdles and then argues that Ubuntu philosophy contains under-emphasized values 5 
for implementing the apparent consensus in ways that overcome the potential barriers, and clarify the 6 
ancillary obligations owed participants, in advance towards a more coordinated/harmonized approach 7 
to research result management and the integration of precision medicine in patient care. It is, therefore, 8 
outside the scope of this study to contend the consensus regarding IFs, albeit “a consensus” as rightly 9 
noted by Schaefer and Savulescu (2018: p. 22), does not necessarily imply correctness. A vast majority 10 
can share a common opinion that may be incorrect. Moreover, a majority of participants in a study 11 
(Middleton et al., 2016: p. 28) still do not think that the consensus is an appropriate policy to adopt now. 12 
And a majority of participants in Mackley and Capps (2017: p. 115) also have doubts about whether the 13 
alleged pathogenic variants themselves are sufficiently informative to justify their return. Contrarily, this 14 
study is a concept paper, and it aims to contribute useful insights enriched by a philosophy from the 15 
global south towards the development of adequate guidelines and policies for managing critical 16 
challenges in the return of research results more broadly, and the apparent consensus around IFs in 17 
particular. 18 
This study will adopt a heuristic technique to achieve its objectives. A heuristic technique is an approach 19 
to problem-solving that makes use of rules of thumb, a set of reasoning rules, bits of knowledge, 20 
methods, and useful principles  – though not guaranteed –  but sufficient enough to accomplish the 21 
immediate goals, produce a practical solution or improve the efficiency of a system. The rules of thumb 22 
and bits of knowledge are themselves called heuristics. This technique is suitable for interdisciplinary 23 
studies that seek to combine knowledge from disparate disciplines to address complex ethical 24 
challenges in clinical care and biomedical research. As explained by Romanycia and Pelletier (1985: p. 25 
57), the utility of heuristic technique derives from its ability to capture some facts, some insights about 26 
the problem domain, and applying other ideas and truths from elsewhere to the problem domain. In 27 
keeping with this technique, this article will proceed in the first section to highlight the emerging 28 
consensus regarding IFs in published literature. In the second and third section respectively, the study 29 
will outline the potential barriers to an effective implementation of this apparent consensus, and then 30 
show how Ubuntu philosophy may be used to develop heuristics for addressing these hurdles. In the 31 
final section, the study will identify some moral constraints in the outlined heuristics.  32 
 33 
The Emerging Consensus Regarding IFs in Genomic Research  34 
The broad consensus as repeatedly affirmed by several empirical studies such as [deleted for blind 35 
review], and Middleton and colleagues (2016), shows that there is an ethical obligation2 to return 36 
                                                             
2 There is not yet a legal obligation for researchers to return incidental findings which meet the outlined threshold 
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individual genetic incidental findings3 – regardless of whether such information was discovered 1 
unintentionally or the result of a deliberate opportunistic screening – that meet the threshold of analytic 2 
and clinical validity4 have clinical utility5 and actionable6, provided that research contributors have not 3 
opted out from receiving such information. This apparent consensus cuts across the board [deleted for 4 
blind review]. The majority of researchers, research contributors, public, geneticists, IRB members, and 5 
chairs, to name a few, all believe that IFs that meet the described threshold should be offered to 6 
consenting contributors.  But IFs with unknown clinical significance, personal implications, or findings 7 
that reveal untreatable conditions generally received less support (for return) in published studies.  8 
There are areas of disagreement. For example, the relative weight that should be given to each of these 9 
standards varies in published studies. Categorically, scholars disagree over whether findings with clinical 10 
utility should be offered to family members who are not direct contributors to a research study. 11 
Disclosure – when it occurs without the consent of the participant – to non-consenting relatives raises 12 
its unique set of moral conflicts that require delicate balancing. This may conflict with a participant’s 13 
right to privacy; it may also conflict with the relatives’ right not-to-know; or the researcher’s ability to 14 
contribute generalizable knowledge. The relative weight that should be given to each duty has also not 15 
been highlighted and justified. Disagreements also exist over who should communicate IFs to 16 
participants – the primary caregiver, the investigator, or the investigator’s institution?  Who should fund 17 
IFs return, and duration of an ethical obligation to return, are other contentious issues in published 18 
studies. The scope of the ancillary duties and obligations owed to genomic research contributors and 19 
participants has not been adequately clarified in published studies, to allow for an effective 20 
implementation of this consensus. This scope must be explained to overcome the gap in practice 21 
identified by some studies. For example, while a majority of participants reportedly have expressed the 22 
view (Darnell et al., 2016: p. 436; Vos, van Delden, van Diest, & Bredenoord, 2017: p. 124) that IFs which 23 
                                                             
3 IFs must be differentiated from individual research results and aggregate research results, both of which often fall 
within research objective and may have clinical and/or personal significances. Aggregate research results are 
general results drawn from samples of a group and concerns the group, while individual research result concerns 
an individual. The current debate largely focuses on the disclosure of IFs and the decisions about returning 
individual and aggregate research results dependly greatly on the agreement - usually stated on the consent form - 
between researchers and contributor/community; the type of study, relevant research guidelines, clinical 
relevance of result and the ethical approval. Also note that an IF may have one of the following clinical 
significances:1. clinically actionable – one is at a risk for a future preventable or manageable health problem or 
already has a health problem for which a clinical action is available; 2. not-clinically actionable – clinical action is 
not available or no clinical implication; and 3. no-known clinical significance, that is the implication for one’s health 
is at the moment unknown(Issues, 2013; Pike, Rothenberg, & Berkman, 2013: p. 4).  
4 Analytic validity refers to the reliability and accuracy of the test or the "capacity of the test to measure the 
characteristic it is designed to identify" (Thorogood et al, 2014: p. 8.). Clincal validity refers tothe accuracy with 
which the test predicts the condition. A mere a mere suspicion of a disease does not pass this criterion. Analytic 
and clinical validity significantly reduces the likelihood of false positive findings. Validation also need to be 
undertaken in laboratories optimized for clinical care 
5 If finding has an implication for one's health or that of one's offspring or reveals an established disease-causing 
pathogenic variants, or the probability of a serious treatable condition occuring is high. For example, IFs which 
reveals a brain tumor 
6 A condition for which a clinical intervention/treatment exists; or for which benefits associated with 
communication outweighs the risk of harm. Misattributed paternity, for example, has no clinical intervention, 
hence, it is not clinically actionable. But a predisposition to treatable breast cancer is clinically actionable.  
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meet the threshold for return should be offered to consenting individuals, only a minority return such 1 
findings.    2 
Besides the areas of disagreement, there are areas for further research. Some studies (Middleton et al., 3 
2016: p. 23) have revealed that only a minority of their study participants expect genomic researchers to 4 
actively search for incidental findings not relevant to their research aim. This contradicts – and should be 5 
further empirically studied – The American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (hereafter: 6 
ACMG)  recommendations that genomic researchers should actively search for, as well as report, a 7 
subset of secondary genomic findings in disease-causing genes/variants or variants with known 8 
pathogenicity in the updated pre-defined list. 7   In the next section, this study will outline some serious 9 
obstacles to an effective implementation of the apparent consensus around IFs. These (implementation) 10 
issues have received little attention in published literature. As noted by one study (Sullivan & Berkman, 11 
2018: p. 21), contributions to the discourse on IFs in [genomic] research have come mainly from western 12 
countries. The near-complete absence of conceptual reflection about the return of IFs from Africa is 13 
deeply problematic, not just for reasons of epistemic justice but also because it constitutes a missed 14 
opportunity to bring to the table different perspectives that can help us understand problems that arise 15 
across diverse contexts, hence, the strategic importance of this study.  16 
 17 
Serious Obstacles to Implementing the Emerging Consensus 18 
There are dilemmas in practice that should be addressed to implement the emerging consensus to 19 
return significant IFs effectively. There are three critical dilemmas in practice that must be addressed. 20 
They include the cost of identifying, validating and communicating IFs, actionability problem, and the 21 
current variations in policies regarding research results.  22 
One empirical study conducted by Solomon and colleagues (2012), has found that the burden (on the 23 
research enterprise) of returning IFs is enormous. Specifically, it took a significant amount of personnel 24 
time, professional expertise, counseling, effort, resources, and funds to validate and return a single IF.  25 
Cost, as rightly pointed out by Darnell and colleagues (2016: p. 438), will include time needed for a 26 
geneticist to screen variants for a clinically actionable and pathogenic subset, validation test, counseling, 27 
and support necessary for returning validated IFs. One study (Darnell et al., 2016: p. 438) estimates 28 
between $26 and $83 as the cost of screening each submitted variant. This is a lot in population studies 29 
or large scale sequencing studies that are capable of producing large volumes of potentially disease-30 
causing pathogenic variants. Researchers may also not be qualified to screen variants. A doctoral 31 
student surveying the functional magnetic resonance imaging cannot be expected to possess the level of 32 
expertise of an experienced neuro-radiologist when reviewing scans.   33 
Additionally, some IFs will require immediate clinical intervention, while others will require further 34 
investigation and validation. IFs validation will require expensive tests usually carried out in laboratories 35 
                                                             
7 Usually a pre-defined list of 59 genes where most pathogenic variants are “known” to be associated with certain 
types of cancer and cardiac conditions 
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optimized for clinical care, such as the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (hereafter: CLIA) 1 
accredited laboratories. Many genomic research studies are conducted in non-certified laboratories. 2 
This can limit a researcher’s ability to return IFs for clinical purposes. The turnaround time for validating 3 
a single variant – from sample receipt to reporting – could take some days, since the result report must 4 
be written by a certified geneticist, who must provide relevant technical information regarding the 5 
clinical use of findings. 6 
Furthermore, genetic counseling may be required to prepare donors to receive IFs and reduce anxiety in 7 
them. An investigator with expertise in epidemiology cannot be assumed to have the expertise of a 8 
genetic counselor, and thus, researchers may have to employ trained professionals or genetic 9 
counselors. In many African countries, as found by Munung and colleagues (2018: p. 5), the capacity to 10 
validate, as well as take advantage of clinically actionable, IFs is significantly limited due to the lack of 11 
clinical and diagnostic laboratories for genomic medicine in general; the lack of competent laboratory 12 
technicians; and the near absence of skilled clinical geneticists and genetic counselors. In fact, according 13 
to Nembaware and colleagues (2019: p. 2) South Africa is the only African country with the critical mass 14 
of skilled genetic counselors, medical geneticists, and key personnel for the implementation of genomic 15 
medicine. It might require a lot of money to solicit the service of foreign professionals. Funds, 16 
sometimes, may not be allotted in budgets to cover such extra cost, and researchers are required to use 17 
the funds they receive for their intended purpose (research). Consequently, imposing a burden of an 18 
additional cost of validating and returning IFs on researchers may jeopardize their ability to advance 19 
science. As  Mackley and Capps (2017: p. 115) rightly noted, such a burden may also widen the gap 20 
between researchers and institutions that can cover the cost and those who cannot. Proposals for 21 
mitigating the cost of validating and implementing this emerging consensus must be clearly articulated 22 
in the literature to allow for effective implementation of this emerging consensus. 23 
Implementing the emerging consensus in resource-poor settings where participants lack the resources 24 
to take advantage of actionable results will likely create genuine dilemmas for researchers and raise 25 
further questions regarding how to assess benefits to participants. For example, returning actionable 26 
findings that an individual cannot take advantage of, may lead to other problems such as anxiety or 27 
trauma. Sullivan and Berkman (2018: p. 21) call this an actionability problem, which is a conflation of 28 
clinical actionability with access to care. In other words, the actionability problem implies that the 29 
existence of a clinical intervention such as preventive mastectomies to mitigate or cure conditions such 30 
as BRCA 1 does not mean that individuals who have a predisposition to this disease would always be 31 
able to access such costly interventions. And an individual’s capacity to take advantage of these findings 32 
may be constrained by limited financial resources. For example, in South Africa, the trajectory of care of 33 
cancer patients is saturated by service barriers. Some of these include low cancer detection skills, 34 
inadequate oncology training standards, resource-constrained care services, inefficient cancer referral 35 
pathways, and low suspicion of cancer at the primary care level. In addition to service barriers, 36 
widespread poverty, lack of insurance, stigma, accessibility of healthcare services, competing health 37 
priorities and low cancer awareness, are other known barriers that sometimes lead to discontinuation of 38 
care of cancer patients or presentation of late-stage diseases with poor treatment outcomes (Edwards & 39 
Greeff, 2017: p. 4). In summary, the actionability problem must be anticipated and addressed.   40 
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Finally, guidelines also need to be aligned across settings to allow for effective implementation of this 1 
emerging consensus. For genomic research to translate into personalized care, collaborative research is 2 
required. As noted by Vos and colleagues (2017: p. 126), proper genomic research requires, as well as 3 
thrives, on collaborations across societies. But there are extensive variations in policies and regarding 4 
result management that exist between jurisdictions in ways that can hinder the implementation of the 5 
emerging consensus, lead to inconsistencies/arbitrariness in practice around IFs, or leave researchers, 6 
research institutions, and ethics committees in doubt about their true duties regarding IFs. Practices, 7 
therefore, need to be reformed, and cross-border practices regarding research results need to be more 8 
closely aligned to address heterogeneity in research collaboration and accelerate the integration of 9 
personalized care within the clinical context across regions. In subsequent sections, this study will 10 
develop some heuristics for addressing these obstacles and contributing towards a standardized 11 
approach to research result management. 12 
 13 
Ubuntu Philosophy and the Emerging consensus around IFs 14 
In this section – keeping with the heuristic technique, I will describe some heuristics (rooted in Ubuntu 15 
philosophy8) for clarifying the secondary obligations owed participants, thereby contributing towards a 16 
more coordinated approach to research result management across borders that still gives freedom to 17 
each jurisdiction to make additional decisions about returning IFs. 18 
This study has not claimed that Ubuntu philosophy is the best philosophy for achieving the set 19 
objectives. However, this African philosophy, rather than other western moral theories such as Kantian 20 
ethics, is more likely to contribute an African perspective to the growing literature on the discourse 21 
around IFs in genomic research. The formulation of Ubuntu philosophy, which I apply here, has been 22 
substantially developed elsewhere in a systematic review and is the result of our [redacted]  23 
methodological contribution towards a definition of Ubuntu that encompasses the common themes 24 
which run across existing, sometimes competing, interpretations of this philosophy. This section builds 25 
on the outcome of that systematic review by applying the study’s construction of Ubuntu to address the 26 
previously identified obstacles.   27 
‘Ubuntu’ consists of a prefix “ubu” and stem “ntu” which are translated in the published literature as 28 
“humanness” or “personhood”(Cilliers, 2008: 1). This philosophy has been influential across a wide 29 
geographical area south of the Sahara. The philosophy is primarily a normative ethical system which has 30 
its origins in the pre-colonial Southern African Nguni-Bantu oral traditions but has become more 31 
prominent in published studies in post-apartheid South Africa, precisely through philosophical 32 
constructions undertaken by famous scholars such as Thaddeus Metz (2007, 2011), Mogobe 33 
Ramose(2002), Christian Gade (Battle, 2000; 2011, 2012; 1999), Kevin Behrens (2013, 2017), and 34 
                                                             
8 In a previous publication [redacted], I asserted the heterogeneity of “African ethics” in general, and Ubuntu in 
particular, in sub-Saharan Africa. I shall do the same here in this article. For example, the intrinsic wrongness of 
lying in Kantian ethics has no parallel in the Ubuntu ethical system as a whole. This remains an open question 
rather than one settled a priori as in Kantian ethics 
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Motsamai Molefe(2011; 2014). The Bantu languages cover nearly a third of sub-Saharan Africa: south 1 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, south-eastern Nigeria, Gabon, Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, 2 
Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana and South Africa (Muwanga-Zake, 2009: 3 
p. 461).  4 
Note here that Ubuntu philosophy is not representative of all ethical thinking in Africa, nor is it 5 
necessarily widely believed by all individuals living on the continent. Our systematic review [redacted], 6 
reveals that to call Ubuntu ‘African’,  7 
[it] does not imply that all sub-Saharan societies have believed it or have been aware of it. It is a 8 
philosophical construction by moral theorists, which unifies a wide array of the moral judgments 9 
and practices found among many Black Africans spanning a large space in sub-Saharan Africa, 10 
and over a broad time period, from pre-colonial peoples to contemporary literati 11 
This population excludes Arabs in North African and White Afrikaners in South Africa. These salient norms 12 
are not necessarily unique to the region, but they have not come to it from other continents [redacted]. 13 
More accurately, Ubuntu describes the very essence of being a person/human based on salient beliefs 14 
and favored values that are more common with mostly black African people living in the sub-Saharan 15 
region, than amongst westerners. These values include exhibiting caring behaviors, relationships, 16 
friendliness, prizing communal relationships, rather than themes such as respect for individual 17 
autonomy and independence dominant in the global North. Additionally, while themes like a sense of 18 
community might also be found in the global north, the prevailing philosophies in the global North do 19 
not generally conceive these values as core in prescribing duties, as is found in Ubuntu philosophy. 20 
The famous South African anti-apartheid and Human Rights activist, and former Chair of the Truth and 21 
Reconciliation Commission, Archbishop Desmond Tutu,  is frequently quoted in the published literature 22 
as defining Ubuntu in the following way:  23 
When we want to give high praise to someone we say, “Yu, u nobuntu”; he or she has Ubuntu. 24 
This means that they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They share 25 
what they have. It also means that my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. 26 
We belong in a bundle of life…I am human because I belong, I participate, I share. A person with 27 
Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others 28 
are able and good; for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes with knowing that he or 29 
she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, 30 
when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are 31 
(Dreyer, 2015: 195). 32 
Ubuntu philosophy requires one to be a specific sort of human who exhibits the preceding virtues or 33 
relate communally/harmoniously, who shares a way of life with others, who enhances the relational 34 
capacity of others, and who cares for their quality of life. Hence, the maxim (in Zulu) umuntu ngumuntu 35 
ngabantu (in Xhosa Ubuntu ungamntu ngabanye abantu); meaning: ‘I am because we are’; or ‘a person 36 
is a person through other persons.’ 37 
The communal character of Ubuntu, as Metz (2012: 394) pointed out, is core in defining personhood and 38 
prescribing ethical duties, and it requires a combination of identifying with others and exhibiting 39 
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solidarity. Identifying with others implies thinking of oneself as part of a we (cognition), developing a 1 
sense of togetherness or expressing shame/pride in what the group does (emotions), engaging in joint 2 
projects (conation), adopting goals consistent with those of others (volition), and finally, coordinating 3 
behavior to realize shared ends because this is who we are (motivation). On the other hand, exhibiting 4 
solidarity implies empathic awareness of others’ conditions, helping others for altruistic sake, acting in 5 
ways that are likely to be of good to others, caring for other’s condition, or improving their quality of life 6 
(Thaddeus Metz, 2016: 138). Metz (2012: 394) describes a  combination of identifying and exhibiting 7 
solidarity as “friendliness.” To this end, this philosophy defines right action as right to the extent that it 8 
promotes friendliness in which individuals identify with each other and exhibit solidarity with another. 9 
Keeping with the heuristic technique, the rule of thumb that applies in the philosophy of Ubuntu is that 10 
the right action is one that connects, rather than divides, individuals in communal relationships. 11 
Furthermore, note that in every communal relationship, one is either a subject or an object of 12 
communal relationships: “we are, therefore I am, and since I am, therefore we are” (Gade, 2012). One is 13 
a subject if one can think of oneself as part of a “we”, develop a sense of togetherness with other 14 
humans, express shame/pride in what other humans do, act in ways that are likely to be of others’ good 15 
or improve their quality of life. One is an object if other humans can think of one as a part of a “we”; if 16 
other humans can develop a sense of togetherness with one, help one for altruistic sake, and act in ways 17 
that are likely to be of one’s good or improve one’s quality of life.  The capacity to be both an object and 18 
subject of communal relationship is essential for achieving full moral status or personhood, which 19 
cannot be acquired by being a subject or an object only. In light of this:    20 
A) There is an ethical obligation to return IFs when, on the balance of probabilities, this is more 21 
likely to improve another’s quality of life or foster another’s capacity for a communal 22 
relationship since through such action, one develops one’s personhood/humanness. 23 
To have a capacity for something, as one study (Thaddeus Metz, 2012: p. 394) explains, implies to be 24 
able ‘in principle,’ without changes to one’s nature. Hindrances to one being a subject or object are not 25 
part of this ‘capacity.’ Hoffman and Metz (2017) Ubuntu-based capabilities’ approach is useful for 26 
further specifying how one’s capacity may be fostered in the above norm. Ubuntu-based capabilities’ 27 
approach describes the opportunity – which an individual has reason to value – one has to pursue deep 28 
communal relationships or the capacity for the same. The capacity lessens as the opportunity decreases 29 
and vice versa. Illness diminishes one’s capacity to be a true subject (since one needs to be healthy to 30 
care for others); as a result, one’s opportunity for deep communal relationships. Where [future] illness 31 
could be avoided; precisely, where an IF that reveals a high predisposition to preventable/treatable 32 
disease that can undermine one’s capacity for deep communal relationship, there is an obligation to 33 
return such finding, hence norm A. The failure to return such discovery is a failure to be a true subject 34 
who acts in ways that are more likely to improve the quality of life of others, who are objects of 35 
communal relationships. 36 
Ubuntu philosophy favors the emerging consensus that IFs which reveal a high predisposition to 37 
preventable/treatable disease ought to be returned. Also, the relational character of Ubuntu prohibits a 38 
genomic researcher from seeking research goals without due regard for the participants and 39 
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participants’ community. In this way, this philosophy aligns with Kantian philosophy, which teaches us 1 
never to use people merely as a means to an end.  However, unlike Kantian philosophy, which defines 2 
the right action in terms of how it enhances an individual’s capacity for autonomy, Ubuntu defines right 3 
action as right to the extent that it fosters social cohesion and communal relationships. Following the 4 
preceding:  5 
B) The ethical obligation to return IFs ceases if, on the balance of probabilities, the news is likely to 6 
[adversely] impact another’s quality of life or diminish their capacity for communal relationship.  7 
In light of the above rule, IFs with unknown, as well as “not-clinically actionable findings” such as 8 
Alzheimer's disease, “may not” be returned if the information will likely kill the individual faster than the 9 
disease. There might be grounds when such IFs may be returned to participants: if this will help 10 
individuals and their families anticipate this condition and act to prevent disharmony. For example, one 11 
can imagine that such a finding would propel people to make financial and care provisions for old age; 12 
draft a will to divide any assets, which could prevent burdens and fights between family members in the 13 
future. In sum, norm B implies that unknown, as well as not-clinically actionable findings, may be 14 
returned to the extent that they foster opportunities for communal relationships.   15 
A critic may point out that the relative weight that should be given to “probability” and “likelihood” in 16 
the moral rules I outlined are mostly unclear. In response to this, I affirm that the state of the science – 17 
prevailing scientific knowledge and availability of interventions/therapies – will play a significant role in 18 
the assessment of probability and likelihood. IFs raise a unique problem, given that they show 19 
incomplete penetrance. As one author has shown (Hellwig et al., 2019: p. 2), “it is possible that 20 
individuals with pathogenic or likely pathogenic variants in these genes may never develop symptoms.” 21 
But the communal relational character of this philosophy requires that where information – given the 22 
state of the science – is more likely, on the balance of probabilities, to foster life in the community or 23 
improve one’s quality of life, one must disclose such information. It is in this way that this philosophy is 24 
a useful philosophy for providing strong ethical support for implementing the emerging consensus to 25 
return IFs, which are probabilistic, even the clinically validated ones9, and thus complements rescue 26 
principle. Rescue principle10 is a frequently cited justification for the ethical obligation to return 27 
                                                             
9 Clinically validation of incidental findings in genomic research does not negate their probabilistic nature 
generally. A validated finding simply means that it is confirmed, and less likely to be a false positive, that someone 
has a predisposition to a life-threatening disesease or could develop a condition owing to the presence of a 
pathogenic variant. But validation does not imply that they will certainly develop the condition in the future. For 
example, an individual with an increased risk of breast cancer owing to the presence of a variant of the breast 
cancer type 1 gene, may never live long enough to have the disease. This is in this sense in which most published 
studies have used the phrase probabilistic findings in relation to IFs in genomic research.  I also find Sullivan and 
Berkmans’ (2018: p. 23) explanation on this issue very apt. According to them, “genetic findings are probabilistic, 
and disorders may not manifest for years. Because genes interact  with other genes, the environment, and 
behavior, the development of  a particular disease or phenotype is  not certain or immediate.” 
10 The rescue principle requires individuals to take reasonable steps to help those in life-threatening situation, 
provided that such rescue is necessary, and does not come at a significant risk of harm to themselves; is likely to 
succeed; and the benefit to the victim outweighs likely harm to the helper. To this end, a researcher acts ethically 
when s/he returns a significant IF to consenting individual contributors who have a predisposition to a life-
threatening disease owing to the presence of a pathogenic variant. 
10 
 
actionable IFs. But this principle is significantly limited. Rescue cases, as noted by several studies 1 
(Sullivan & Berkman, 2018: p. 23; Vos et al., 2017: p. 121), are concrete and unforeseeable cases, where 2 
threats are immediate, and urgent action is required. Contrarily, IFs are probabilistic findings of a 3 
disease in the foreseeable future, which may require proactive measures. 4 
Moreover, providing clinically significant IFs without treatment, as rightly pointed out by Sullivan and 5 
Berkman (2018: p. 23), is not complete rescue. Ubuntu philosophy can usefully supplement the rescue 6 
principle to provide strong support for implementing the emerging consensus. While clinically validated 7 
IFs might not definitively imply that one will develop the condition; if there is, however, a reasonable 8 
chance that such information could contribute towards improving another’s quality of life by adopting 9 
lifestyles that may delay disease development; or their capacity to be a true subject or object of 10 
communal relationship, one is thus, under an obligation in this philosophy of life to return such finding. 11 
A failure to do so implies a failure to exhibit solidarity with another person. Specifically, it is a failure to 12 
act in ways that are more likely to improve the quality of life of others or foster their opportunity for a 13 
deep communal relationship.  14 
 15 
Ubuntu Philosophy and IFs with Personal and Reproductive Significances 16 
It is important to note that these rules of thumb provide clarification not only regarding how to 17 
implement the emerging consensus regarding IFs effectively; they also urge a return of findings with 18 
personal or reproductive significance. Currently, scholars are split regarding whether such results should 19 
be returned to consenting participants. The Ubuntu philosophy, which I have applied here, equally 20 
requires that where a finding might enhance another’s conception of his/her personhood, one must 21 
return such result. This ethical duty is grounded in the obligation to act in ways that are more likely to be 22 
of good to others. Such a gesture will demonstrate concern for the welfare of participants and 23 
strengthen the fiduciary relationship with them (participants). For example, IFs about misattributed 24 
paternity accidentally discovered in a genomics study of paternal inheritance of cardiomyopathies could 25 
be of great benefit to a presumed biological child11. The presumed biological child might be relieved that 26 
s/he has not inherited the rogue genes. Similarly, IFs about misattributed paternity will also be hugely 27 
beneficial to an alleged father paying child support. There is a more compelling reason – grounded in the 28 
African philosophy of Ubuntu – to return IFs of misattributed paternity. In the philosophy of Ubuntu, one 29 
is a person because of his/her community. Returning IFs of misattributed paternity will lead to the 30 
knowledge of one’s true family background or community, where one ought to develop his/her 31 
personhood. 32 
Furthermore, the emerging consensus regards certain IFs that should be returned to consenting 33 
participants. A question may be asked that in the absence of consent, does this moral theory support an 34 
ethical duty to return significant IFs? In the philosophy of Ubuntu, one cannot achieve personhood by 35 
                                                             
11 I note here that an equally compelling counter-argument may also be advanced. One may argue for example, 
that returning IFs about misattributed paternity will constitute a violation of one’s right not to know. This is why 
the discussion regarding whether to return IFs to participants generates a dilemma.  
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oneself. The community must also be involved by requiring individuals to embrace a socially generated 1 
body of norms, “we are, therefore I am, and since I am, therefore we are” [redacted]. As previously 2 
stated, being a subject and an object of relationship is essential for gaining full personhood in this 3 
philosophy. This explains why health and healing are communal goods; “individual health and 4 
community health continuously influence each other in the philosophy of Ubuntu” [redacted]. When 5 
one fails to act in ways that are necessary to improve the quality of life of others, the individual devalues 6 
his/her personhood. Within this framework, non-consensual disclosure of life-saving information is 7 
permissible and not necessarily tyrannical, only on the basis of the obligation as subjects of communal 8 
relationships, to engage in caring behaviors that help others (objects of communal relationships) to 9 
genuinely share a way of life with the community, and achieve their potentials as full humans/persons. I 10 
call this beneficent paternalism (or an action with a protective intent), and it aligns with the Spanish 11 
research guidelines, which encourage researchers to override participant’s preference not to know 12 
clinically significant findings.  13 
Beneficent paternalism addresses the concerns regarding consent expressed by Viberg and colleagues 14 
(2016), even though the question “How do lay people understand risk probability?” is one that requires 15 
further empirical investigation. Viberg and colleagues (2016: p. 201) argue in their study that giving 16 
participants freedom of choice to elicit their preferences regarding probabilistic findings assumes that 17 
they understand what they decide about and can express what they truly want. Results prove that most 18 
people sometimes fail to meet this rational model when it comes to decisions about uncertainty. 19 
Precisely, findings show that people can overestimate or underestimate probabilities depending on their 20 
mood and how the question is presented, and thus, make decisions that do not express what they 21 
indeed prefer (Viberg et al., 2016). Hence, returning IFs even to participants who consented to it in the 22 
informed consent form does not necessarily respect the individual. 23 
Beneficent paternalism addresses this challenge by providing clarification regarding when a violation of 24 
participant’s consent may occur, whether the consent truly expresses the participant’s wishes or not. 25 
This also applies to situations where participants must be re-identified for assessment of the clinical 26 
utility of IFs. Note, however, beneficent paternalism – which I have grounded in the philosophy of 27 
Ubuntu – does not wipe away individuality or subordinates individual rights. Instead, one’s individuality 28 
persists. Lutz (2009: 314) explains this when he remarks that in this inherently relational philosophy, the 29 
individual does not pursue the common good instead of his good, but seeks his own good through 30 
pursuing the common good. Metz (2011: 540) also adds, “honouring communal relationships would 31 
involve, roughly, being as friendly as one can oneself and doing what one can to foster friendliness in 32 
others [such as providing beneficial information that can improve a non-consenting individual’s quality 33 
of life] without one using a very unfriendly means.” To this end:  34 
C) In situations where the threshold for clinical actionability is very high (really life-saving 35 
information), one acts rightly when s/he undertakes – by means that are not unfriendly but are 36 
more likely to be of good to others – to provide life-saving information to non-consenting 37 
individuals when this is necessary to improve their quality of life or foster their capacity for 38 
communal relationships.  39 
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While a consequentialist’s approach, for example, will permit causing harm intentionally, this theory 1 
emphasizes that both the consequences of an action, as well as the end, must be good.  One, for 2 
example, may not disclose an individual’s health information on public radio when this could be 3 
achieved by some private means. As previously stated, a failure to act for another’s quality of life implies 4 
a failure to respect the value of friendliness as required by this philosophy, because this is not who we 5 
are (motivation). Caring for other’s quality of life, as Metz (2014: p. 71) explains, roughly involves doing 6 
what is more likely – on the balance of probabilities – to make others better off.   7 
 8 
Ubuntu Heuristic, Research Result Management, and Moral Constraints 9 
The heuristics I outlined out in the previous sections are not without certain constraints. In other words, 10 
they are not absolute. In Ubuntu philosophy, one’s sense of moral obligation towards others decreases 11 
as the degree of relationship lessens. This philosophy is thus, not impartial. Regardless of the 12 
nationalities, the familiar maxim in African morality is “family first, and charity begins at home” (T. Metz, 13 
2017). Bias is permissible based on long-standing relationships. Long-standing on-going relationships 14 
have moral importance over present relationships that may not be longstanding, and current or existing 15 
relationships have moral importance over future relationships or a previous relationship that was 16 
terminated in the past [redacted]. In entering into a relationship with an individual, based on Ubuntu 17 
philosophy, one must show solidarity towards the individual.  18 
The “family first and charity begins at home,” implies that fulfilling this obligation will be determined by 19 
two things: nature of the relationship and the deepness of the relationship. Concerning the former, this 20 
study reiterates the differentiation published reviews make between research context and clinical 21 
context. In a research context, the primary obligation is to advance science by contributing to 22 
generalizable knowledge (Levine, 2003). A clinical relationship, on the other hand, is oriented towards 23 
providing health benefits to the patients. In other words, researchers, unlike physicians (who have a 24 
higher obligation to follow-up on a patient’s health), are not necessarily required to act for the health 25 
benefits of research participants (Solberg & Steinsbekk, 2012). A researcher’s shared experience with 26 
the research participant implies that the primary goal of their relationship is to contribute to 27 
generalizable knowledge. Consequently, the researcher should not be taxed – for example, to pay the 28 
medical bills of the participants – to the extent that he cannot honor his more significant commitment 29 
to advance science. A researcher’s duty to follow-up on a participant’s health needs is contingent upon 30 
the greater obligation to advance science. The nature of this shared experience between the researcher 31 
and participant should be clearly defined in the informed consent form from the outset. 12 Also, the 32 
preceding implies that where a clinical relationship (with the contributor) were to continue after the 33 
research period, the researcher (now health professional) may use – but is never obligated – his/her 34 
findings from research to improve the quality of life of that patient. Some research participants appear 35 
to have this understanding. In an empirical study (Sundby et al., 2017: p. 2650), a majority of research 36 
                                                             
12 I note here that there are other sources of obligations beyond what is specified in the consent form, such as the 
primary duty to promote communal relationship or the partial-entrustment mode of Belsky and Richardson (2004). 
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participants say they consider themselves as selfless individuals who do not expect to benefit from 1 
participating in research directly.  2 
The responsibility to return will also be determined by the deepness of the relationship, where deepness 3 
based on Ubuntu philosophy, “is determined by both intimacy (i.e., the extent of communion) and 4 
duration (i.e., the historical configuration of fellowship) (Woermann & Engelbrecht, 2019: p. 35). To this 5 
end, a researcher’s relationship with current and existing research participants has moral importance 6 
over his future relationships or relationship with previous participants with whom he has no ongoing 7 
relationship. The ancillary duties towards past research participants will be determined by the 8 
researcher’s ability to fulfill his obligation to current participants, the research sponsors, and the 9 
immediate institutions. The setting where the finding occurred, lack of expertise, absence of 10 
professional genetic counselors, and the type of relationship between the researcher and participant; 11 
these are other factors that can influence the decision to return IFs or care for previous participants.   12 
Where researcher (or the research team) has a relationship with the contributor because the samples 13 
were collected directly from the participants, the obligation to return is limited by the researcher’s (or 14 
the research team’s) ability to achieve his research objectives since research predates subject 15 
recruitment, the researcher’s obligations to research funders, and research institution. Similarly, the 16 
ethical obligation to return IFs where a researcher has no direct relationship (secondary researchers) 17 
with the contributor because samples were collected from the biobank, is limited by the existing 18 
relationships that might have a greater hold on the researcher, such as the relationship with research 19 
sponsors. The preceding is the case because honoring communion, as Metz  (2017) pointed out, is not 20 
the same as maximizing it. Honoring communion implies giving all of one’s existing relationships their 21 
appropriate due.  22 
Deepness of relationship also implies that a blanket requirement for opportunistic screenings – or an 23 
absolute duty to return IFs – is not supported by Ubuntu. Specifically, given that bias is permissible 24 
based on long-standing relationships in the philosophy of Ubuntu, the obligation to return IFs or 25 
opportunistically screen for other significant findings is not an absolute one. This obligation is limited by 26 
other more substantial commitments. This proposal consistent with the views expressed by a majority in 27 
some studies (Middleton et al., 2016: p. 27; Sundby et al., 2017: pp. 2652-3) that they do not think 28 
researcher’s (or the research team) should be required to return IFs or opportunistically screen for other 29 
findings if this will jeopardize their ability to address research questions. Inclusion of a blanket promise 30 
to return IFs will neither supported by Ubuntu philosophy nor will this align practices regarding research 31 
result management across settings. The restraints Ubuntu highlights here align with CCMG, RCPA and 32 
ESHG recommendation for researchers to adopt a more targeted approach, while still allowing some 33 
freedom to opportunistically screen for significant findings given other extant relationships; or while still 34 
allowing other factors such as the setting, cultural values, and preferences to play a role in the decision 35 
about who gets clinically essential information.  36 
 A few things should be clarified concerning the explanation this study provides above. Note that where 37 
a researcher or research team may not be able to return IFs to participants because the researcher does 38 
not have a direct relationship with the participant, the researcher or the research team should make 39 
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some effort to return such findings to the biobank with whom the researcher (or the research team) has 1 
a direct relationship; as long as this will not undermine their more significant obligations. If the biobank 2 
retains a link with the contributor, the biobank ought to return such actionable findings. The ground for 3 
this duty is the obligation to foster the capacity for communal relationships. A failure to return such 4 
results, when doing so will not undermine one’s ability to fulfill other more significant obligations, 5 
implies a failure to be a true subject of communal relationship by acting in ways that are likely to 6 
improve the quality of life of others, or increase their opportunity for a deep communal relationship. 7 
This proposal is consistent with the partial entrustment model proposed by Belsky and Richardson 8 
(2004), which generally argues that relationships (direct or indirect) between researchers and 9 
participants involve a partial and limited entrustment of participant’s health to researchers, through the 10 
permission they give when joining a study. Since a participant typically provides consent for a disease 11 
under investigation, the scope of entrustment involves at least caring for that disease or following up on 12 
any other clinically relevant condition. How the researcher cares may differ from case to case (Belsky & 13 
Richardson, 2004: p. 1495). 14 
In summary, where there is some relationship, there is some kind of obligation. But the force of this 15 
obligation depends on the nature and deepness of the relationship: the more profound the relationship, 16 
the higher the commitment, such that the researcher has a more significant responsibility to those 17 
individuals with whom they have a longstanding, current or more profound relationship. In light of this:  18 
D) In making decisions about returning IFs, long-standing and existing relationships should take 19 
priority over new/future relationships that are not long-standing.   20 
I am optimistic that if these formulations stressed by Ubuntu are integrated into current research ethics 21 
and approaches, they will align practices across borders while still leaving some room for each region or 22 
professional body to make additional guidelines regarding other issues such as ‘who should return IFs’; 23 
or which studies should return IFs. 24 
In addition to the constrained obligation to return significant IFs, Ubuntu also imposes two other duties: 25 
first, a duty to return individual research results that are actionable (such as those associated with about 26 
24 disorders with high penetrance and clinical actionability on the ACMG list) and second, a duty to 27 
benefit the community by returning (significant) aggregate results that may be used to influence policies 28 
and improve the quality of life of others or affirm their humanity. I note here that this rule may be 29 
difficult to apply where a researcher-participant relationship (or research team-participant relationship) 30 
co-substantively occurs with a physician-patient relationship such as in the case of clinician-researcher. 31 
Where such clear differentiation cannot be made, I reiterate two previously discussed moral rules:  32 
E) A research project should not be burdened to the point that the research team/researcher is 33 
unable to honor the obligations owed to other parties – with whom there is a deeper 34 
relationship.  35 
F) The ethical obligation may not extend beyond the shared experience with the participant. 36 
In light of moral rules grounded in Ubuntu,  the research team may not use research funds to validate 37 
the clinical significance of a finding or to provide counseling that may be required before returning IFs to 38 
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the extent that they are unable to fulfill the obligations towards the institutions and research sponsors, 1 
with whom the team has a deeper relationship. The ethical obligation to return actionable findings is 2 
also constrained by the type of research. Additionally, the research team may not be burdened with 3 
paying for the cost of validating and returning IFs beyond the research period,13 even when a clinical 4 
relationship continues to exist after research. This constraint in the philosophy of Ubuntu is well 5 
described in Metz’s (2009: p. 346) essay on public governance; wherein he suggests that a strongly 6 
partial state which favors nepotism is not justified since it does not serve communal good. The 7 
obligation to serve communal relationship arises from the fact that “all human beings are part of a 8 
family who provides some reason to be responded to [at varying degrees] out of love.” Thus, the needs 9 
of the participant must be carefully balanced against other existing relationships.  10 
 11 
Ubuntu Rules of Thumb, the Actionability Problem, and Mitigating Cost 12 
The ethical theory I apply in this study has some useful insights for addressing the actionability problem 13 
identified by Sullivan and Berkman (2018). The actionability problem reveals a broader societal problem. 14 
Precisely, it shows that the wall which separates the rich and poor, as well as developed and under-15 
developing countries, must be pulled down. While I note that access to available intervention, in 16 
addition to the state of the science as previously stated, will also play a vital role in the assessment of 17 
probability and likelihood; the research team – given the constraints in the ethical theory I apply in this 18 
section – however, cannot be unconditionally burdened with providing this intervention. However, the 19 
relational character of Ubuntu urges a broader duty for the government to improve the standard of 20 
living and make healthcare easily accessible, since, without such access, one’s quality of life may be 21 
adversely affected. In this regard, Ubuntu philosophy is also a useful tool for contributing to the 22 
realization of the United Nations’ goal to end poverty by 2030. 23 
The value of Ubuntu philosophy is, however, not restricted to determining the scope of ancillary duties, 24 
it is also useful for mitigating costs of returning IFs. On the Ubuntu view, human beings are constituted 25 
by a network of interdependent relationships. In Archbishop Tutu’s (cited in Woermann & Engelbrecht, 26 
2019: p. 31) words, to be human is to be “caught up….inextricably bound up…in a bundle of life”. Good 27 
genomic research requires a network of relationships (to realize shared end) that includes IRB or ethics 28 
committees, research institutions, researchers, participants, and other stakeholders such as research 29 
                                                             
13 One may argue that based on the duty to rescue, an obligation to research participants persists beyond the grant 
period. In response I answer that a duty to rescue will exist if the cost of rescue does not come at a significant cost 
to the researcher/research team. Ubuntu philosophy complements the rescue principle by providing clarification 
on how to weigh obligations and assess cost. As I argued in the article, Ubuntu philosophy is not an impartial 
philosophy. In this philosophy (as pointed out on page19),long-standing on-going relationships have moral 
importance over present relationships that may not be longstanding; and current or existing relationships have 
moral importance over future relationships or a previous relationship that was terminated in the past. A 
researcher may not be burdened to provide for the cost of paying for the validation of an IFs of a past participant if 
this would undermine his ability to fulfill his/her obligation towards current research participants or to the 
research project itself. The researcher should, however, pay for this validation if this will not jeopardize his/her 
more pressing obligations. 
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sponsors. From an Ubuntu perspective, everyone on this network must coordinate behaviors to realize 1 
research goals. Precisely, the relational character of this philosophy urges a participative and 2 
collaborative model for mitigating the cost of returning IFs, and effectively implementing the emerging 3 
consensus. The relevant maxim is: “mwana wa mnzako ngwako yemwe, ukachenjera manja udya naye – 4 
“it takes a village to raise a child”(Mugumbate, 2013: p. 95).  5 
Most biomedical research studies are funded by government grants, private companies doing research, 6 
private foundations, and charitable donations. The participative model, expressed by Ubuntu, requires 7 
that these stakeholders in research should be willing to play a role in defraying the cost of returning IFs. 8 
The research team can contribute expertise, wherever they can.  Albeit space has not allowed me to 9 
focus on the obligations of other stakeholders in research in this study, I reiterate (consistent with the 10 
Ubuntu philosophy) the suggestions in existing studies for researchers to anticipate the cost (which 11 
include counseling, professional expertise required, validation, etc.) of returning IFs in the study design 12 
and budget. There are other useful suggestions by Sullivan and Berkman (2018: p. 25) for mitigating 13 
cost, which parallels the participative model grounded in Ubuntu philosophy. According to these 14 
authors, “funders could anticipate these costs [of returning IFs] when awarding grants. Individual 15 
research institutions or affiliated research networks could also reduce costs by creating a single group or 16 
department that provides genetic counseling and support for the return of findings for all affiliated 17 
researchers” (Sullivan & Berkman, 2018: p. 25).  18 
Since nearly all IFs have to be validated in clinically certified laboratories, I equally recommend that 19 
genomic research should be carried out in certified laboratories. This would reduce the likelihood of 20 
returning false-positive results. International funding agencies should also be open to funding research 21 
studies conducted by researchers from developing countries. This will help to bridge the gap between 22 
researchers, as well as research institutions, in poor resource settings and their counterparts in 23 
developed countries. I observe here that further research – using the cost-mitigating model, which I 24 
recommend in this section – is required to correctly spell out how stakeholders can actively participate 25 
in funding the cost to returning IFs and implementing the emerging consensus. Co-ownership of cost or 26 
the joint responsibility for achieving research objectives is more reflective of the communal character of 27 
Ubuntu philosophy and will be vital in the implementation of the emerging consensus around IFs, in 28 
advance towards a more coordinated approach to research result across borders, thereby contributing 29 
towards the realization of the clinical goal of genomic research.  30 
 31 
Conclusion 32 
In this study, I have contributed a set of heuristics which clarifies the ancillary obligations towards 33 
research participants, and is suitable for research across settings, thereby contributing towards the 34 
realization of [genomic] research goal of personalized medicine, and advancing the ELSI of precision 35 
medicine by giving exposure to an under-represented philosophy from the global south.    36 
In addition to the recommendations in the previous sections, I note here that empirical studies are 37 
required to study how to reform current research ethics guidelines, as well as policies, to align with the 38 
17 
 
outlined moral rules in this study. Much work also remains to flesh out the specific additional duties of 1 
the stakeholders in research. Further research is also required to address poverty and bridge the gap 2 
between developed countries and under-developed countries so that individuals in low-resource 3 
settings can take advantage of actionable results. Regardless of the preceding, I hope to have 4 
demonstrated in this study that the philosophy of Ubuntu is a useful ethical theory capable of 5 
supplementing current ethical approaches in contributing towards the much needed harmonized 6 
approach to research result management across borders, and the effective implementation of the 7 
emerging consensus around IFs. 8 
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